TRUE DEMOCRACY SUMMER 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
Number 37, July 1995
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Need for a National Debate
and Keith Payne
Consensus on Theater Missile Defense
There is a strong consensus in the United States concerning
the need for active defenses against theater ballistic missiles, defined
as missiles with a range of 3,500 km or less. This consensus was forged in
the Gulf War, when Iraq launched conventionally-armed missiles at Israel
and Saudi Arabia one striking a U.S. barracks, causing one-quarter of the
U.S. combat fatalities of the conflict. Iraqi missiles were derived from
the 1950's-vintage Scud-B missiles previously provided by the Soviet Union.
The political and military utility of even these relatively crude missiles
was not lost on other states who would use force to achieve their own territorial
and political objectives.
[Ed's note: The reason Iraq fired missiles at Israel is because Iraq hates
Israel. Someone will need to tell me why they fired missiles at Saudi Arabia
if they did. Question everything!]
Developments since Desert Storm have confirmed that states seeking NBC weapons
also seek increasingly capable ballistic missiles as their delivery system
of choice. For example, Iran and Pakistan reportedly have been provided Chinese
technology for M-9 and/ or M-11 missiles. North Korea has flight tested the
1000+ km-range No Dong-1, a missile with the potential to carry NBC warheads,
and may have concluded agreements to provide the No Dong to Iran, Libya and
Syria. Indeed, according to unofficial sources, the delivery of No-Dong missiles
to Iran may already have begun. Such transfers could have profound implications
for stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas of vital U.S. interest.
[Ed's note: Yes, oil and having peace so they can exploit human beings in
terms of labor.]
The Gulf experience and the accelerating pace of missile proliferation have
demonstrated the need for a robust theater missile defense capability. As
a result, the United States has initiated a number of programs to protect
U.S. forces and allies from ballistic missile attack. The "core" TMD programs
of the U.S. effort include: (1) improvements to PATRIOT (PAC-3) and the new
ERINT missile for point defense; (2) THAAD for wide-area theater defense;
and (3) AEGIS/SM-2 Block IVA for tactical missile defense from the sea.
In addition to these core TMD programs, the Clinton Administration has recently
declared the much more capable Navy Upper Tier system described as an "advanced
concept" for "extensive theater-wide protection" to be compliant with the
ABM Treaty. However, as discussed below, it is not clear how substantially
this system (as well as THAAD) has been "dumbed-down" to make it compatible
with the Administration's view of the Treaty.
[Ed's note: Remember Clinton is a Bilderberger and Trilateral Commission
member and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, all aspects of the
Shadow government. See first edition of True Democracy if you haven't
Divergence on National Missile Defense
The consensus on TMD does not exist on national missile defense.
In fact, differences on the central issue of defending the U.S. homeland
from ballistic missile attack are stark, influenced by widely contrasting
perceptions of the threat and the relevance of traditional arms control,
specifically the ABM Treaty, in the post Cold War environment.
Those who oppose initiating an NMD deployment program begin with the premise
that, presently, no proliferant state has the capability to strike U.S. territory
with ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they contend that the emergence of
such a threat in the near or mid-term is very unlikely. Therefore, given
defense budgetary constraints, the United States need not and should not
now pursue NMD. Moreover, NMD critics argue that if a missile threat does
emerge, the United States will be able to deter attacks on its territory
through its conventional superiority and, if necessary, its nuclear offensive
forces, as it did during the decades of the Cold War. In fact, opponents
believe NMD would undermine deference and lead to a new U.S.-Russian nuclear
offensive arms race.
In contrast, NMD advocates point to the proliferation of ballistic missile
programs in countries hostile to the United States. They cite, for example,
the North Korean development of two new multistage missiles. Then-Director
of Central Intelligence, James Wails, publicly acknowledged these North Korean
missiles, and noted that they could pose a threat to "all of Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, much of the Pacific area, and even most of Russia." Indeed,
according to a more recent statement by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense
John Dutch, one of these missiles, the Taipei Dong 2, will have the potential
to strike portions of the United States. According to public testimony by
intelligence officials, these missiles could be operational within three
to five years. If the Taipei Dong 2 has intercontinental potential, is operational
in five years and armed with NBC warheads, an NMD deployment program must
be initiated now if the United States is to escape the prospect of vulnerability
to North Korean missile threats. Moreover, given the North's record of selling
missiles and technologies to other rogue states, the United States could
become vulnerable to unprecedented coercion. In this context, Libya has declared
its intent to acquire missiles with which to threaten the U.S. homeland.
[Ed's note: We don't have proof that this is what Libya would do. Furthermore,
Libya would know that they would be disseminated if they did try anything.
That country and all small countries only have weapons as a defense against
the United States. That, in fact, is why Cuba armed themselves before the
Bay of Pigs. That's the only reason they did.]
These and other emerging threats (e.g., the possible sale of Russian SS-25s
as space launch vehicles) make NMD essential. NMD proponents reject as a
Cold War nostrum the notion that missile defenses would undermine deterrence.
Indeed, they insist that NMD would both contribute to deterrence and provide
an important hedge against the increased potential for deterrence failure
in the post-Cold War era. Deterrence policies must be supplemented by NMD
because the conditions necessary for deterrence mutual familiarity, understanding,
communication, etc. are less likely to pertain in the existing strategic
environment than in the bipolar structure of the past.
The absence of an effective NMD may undercut the ability of the United States
to deter regional aggressors armed with long-range missiles. Such aggressor
states may well judge U.S. deterrence as incredible because of the aggressors
ability to launch retaliatory NBC missile attacks on U.S. cities. Because
the regional aggressor would question the willingness of U.S. leaders to
risk possible missile attacks against U.S. territory, regional deterrence
would be weakened. NMD is therefore essential to establish the credibility
of U.S. regional deterrence policies.
Evolution of the BMD Program
Reflective of these fundamentally different views are the
divergent approaches on NMD taken by the Bush and Clinton Administrations.
In early 1991, following the demise of the Soviet empire, President Bush
reoriented the SDI program from defending against a Soviet first strike to
protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. Two events later that
year validated this shift in focus. First, as stated earlier, ballistic missiles
played a major role in the strategy of the Gulf conflict. Second, the attempted
coup in the Soviet Union raised concerns regarding command and control of
the Soviet strategic arsenal. The redesigned program called Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) envisioned deployment by the end of the decade
of space-based sensors and both theater missile defenses and ground-based
strategic defense interceptors (to be followed by space-based interceptors).
The number of interceptors was to be limited to assuage concerns that defenses
would undermine U.S.-Soviet strategic stability. In this context, the Bush
Administration made clear that the level of strategic defenses deployed would
not undercut the credibility of the Soviet offensive strategic force.
[Ed's note: The Gulf War was just another deceit levied upon the innocent
American people so the elites would reap billions of taxpayer dollars.]
Consistent with this shift in the U.S. program, Soviet and then Russian
leaders acknowledged the need to protect against ballistic missile proliferation
through strengthened active defenses. Indeed, in January 1992 President Yeltsin
called for "a global system for protection of the world community" from the
missile and NBC proliferation threat. Building on the expressed desire of
both the U.S. and Russia to work together to meet a common threat, Bush and
Yeltsin established a high level group to develop a concept for a joint defense
system and to identify areas for cooperation. Between June and September,
the group made progress in such areas as the possibility of sharing early
warning information. However, with the election defeat of President Bush,
this effort came to an end.
The Clinton Administration, soon after assuming office, initiated a series
of national security policy reviews, including the Departement of Defense
Bottom-Up Review to assess overall defense requirements. The BUR recommendations
on missile defenses: (1) assigned first priority to theater missile defenses
and regional threats; (2) downgraded the priority for TMD, changing the focus
from an acquisition program to a technology demonstration/readiness program;
and (3) gave third priority to an advanced technologies program, designed
to develop and demonstrate high payoff technologies for TMD and NMD. Consistent
with these recommendations, the SDIO was renamed BMDO, and restructured to
focus almost exclusively on theater missile defenses.
Downgrading the NMD program to "a hedge against a greater long range missile
threat" reflected a relatively benign view of the threat. The probability
of a deliberate attack on the United States by Russia or China was assessed
to be "extremely low," and the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized
launch was described as "unlikely." Although not excluded, the possibility
of a limited ballistic missile threat to the United States from a third country
"sometime in the first decade of the next century" was not considered urgent
or even sufficiently significant to require an National Missile Defense (NMD)
deployment program. The NMD programs in progress were either cut back (e.g.,
space-based sensors) or killed (e.g., space-based interceptors). Other programs,
such as ground-based NMD interceptors and radars, were reduced and slowed.
Funding for the advanced technologies program was also severely reduced,
impacting directly on advanced capabilities such as the boost-phase interceptor.
With the Republican victory in November 1994, the positions of the Clinton
Administration on BMD have come under increased attack. Pointing to missile
threats from North Korea, Iraq and Iran, Hill leaders have rejected the Administration's
approach to both theater and national missile defense. On TMD, Congress has
objected to negotiations which are seen as placing restrictions on U.S. technologies
which will reduce the effectiveness and raise the costs of U.S. TMD systems.
On NMD, Congress has called for a renewed commitment to effective national
missile defenses and the Senate has directed the deployment of a multiple-site
ND system by 2003.
The Future of the ABM Treaty
Paralleling its reorientation of the BMD program from SDI
to GALS, the Bush Administration revised its position on the ABM Treaty.
Although describing the 1972 Treaty as an outdated relic of the Cold War,
the Administration indicated a willingness to accept limits on the deployment
of strategic defenses, thereby agreeing that the Treaty could remain in effect
if amended to meet the security requirements of the post Cold War period,
including the need to counter the missile threat.
In the fall of 1992, the Bush Administration proposed in the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) a series of formal amendments to the ABM Treaty that would
*eliminated restrictions on development and testing of ABM systems and components;
*eliminated restrictions on radars and sensors;
*eliminated restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems and technologies;
*permitted additional ABM deployment sites, as well as additional launchers
The Bush Administration proposed to clarify the demarcation line between
ABM and non-ABM systems by establishing a demonstrated, verifiable standard
based on the velocity of the target in actual tests involving interceptor
missiles. If the target exceeded the established limit, the tested system
would be considered strategic and, therefore, bound by the restrictions of
the ABM Treaty. In this way, consistent with the original intent of the Treaty,
development, testing and deployment of TMD systems would not be impeded.
The position of the Clinton Administration on the Treaty was radically different
from that of its predecessor. Referring to the ABM Treaty as "the bedrock
of strategic stability," the Clinton Administration took a number of actions
to strengthen the "viability and effectiveness" of the Treaty, including:
* withdrawing the amendments to the Treaty proposed by
the Bush Administration;
* advocating the multilateralization of the Treaty, making
it much more difficult to amend the Treaty in the future; and
* "affirming" the "narrow" interpretation of the Treaty.
On demarcation, although initially adopting the position of the Bush Administration,
the Clinton Administration has agreed to place additional restrictions on
the development, testing and deployment of TMD systems. In short, the ABM
Treaty was made the center-piece of the new Administration's arms control
Following the November 1994 elections, the Clinton Administration's position
on demarcation became a focal point for Congressional objections to the shift
in U.S. policy on the ABM Treaty in general. The new Hill leadership expressed
its firm opposition to the additional restrictions on defensive technologies
which the Administration has either accepted or proposed in the SCC negotiations.
Moreover, Congress has criticized as inadequate the Administration's consultations
on these negotiations, as well as on the issue of multilateralization. More
broadly, Hill leaders have questioned the basic relevance of the ABM Treaty
in today's security environment a world in which the Soviet Union no longer
exists, in which the logic of the Cold War no longer applies, and in which
the foreseeable ballistic missile threats to the United States require effective
The Clinton Administration, caught between congressional pressure and Russian
intransigence, has avoided reconvening the SCC, moving the negotiations to
higher diplomatic levels, culminating in the May Summit in Moscow. The Joint
Statement from the Summit, while described by the Administration as moving
in the direction of Congress, is still viewed as inconsistent with the concerns
of, and positions advocated by Hill leaders. The statement enshrines the
Treaty as the "cornerstone" of U.S.-Russian relations and commits the parties
to a set of "basic principles" to guide demarcation negotiations.
Far from resolving the contentious issues, the Summit "principles" have
been criticized as merely serving to commit the United States to further
negotiations before deploying treaty-compliant TAD systems. For example,
the principle that TAD systems "must not lead to violation or circumvention
of the ABM Treaty" commits the U.S. to negotiations in which it must respond
to hypothetical concerns Moscow may choose to raise not about what U.S. TAD
programs are but about what they might theoretically become. On the basis
of past experience with Soviet negotiators who are now Russian negotiators
critics have predicted endless filibusters over specious concerns designed
to prevent decisive action essential to develop and deploy the defenses the
United States needs.
[Ed's note: Remember this is not defense; it's aggression.]