National Reconnaissance Organization
by Jeffrey T. Richelson
September 27, 2000
For more information:
Jeffrey Richelson 202/994-7000
Michael Evans 202/994-7029
In September 1992 the Department of Defense acknowledged the existence
of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency established in 1961
to manage the development and operation of the nation's reconnaissance satellite
systems. The creation of the NRO was the result of a number of factors.
On May 1, 1960 Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar, Pakistan
on the U-2 mission designated Operation GRAND SLAM. The flight was planned
to take him over the heart of the Soviet Union and terminate at Bodo, Norway.
The main target was Plesetsk, which communications intercepts had indicated
might be the site of an ICBM facility.
1 When the Soviet Union shot down his
plane and captured him alive, they also forced President Dwight Eisenhower
to halt aerial overflights of Soviet territory.
At that time the U.S. had two ongoing programs to produce satellite
vehicles that could photograph Soviet territory. Such vehicles would allow
far more frequent coverage than possible with manned aircraft. In addition,
they would avoid placing the lives of pilots at risk and eliminate the risks
of international incidents resulting from overflights.
The Air Force program, designated SAMOS, sought to develop a number
of different satellite systems--including one that would radio its imagery
back to earth and another that would return film capsules. The CIA program,
CORONA, focused solely on developing a film return satellite.
However, both the CIA and Air Force programs were in trouble. Launch
after launch in the CORONA program, eleven in all by May 1, 1960, eight
of which carried cameras, had resulted in failure--the only variation was
in the cause. Meanwhile, the SAMOS program was also experiencing difficulties,
both with regard to hardware and program definition.
2
Concerns over SAMOS led President Eisenhower to direct two groups
to study both the technical aspects of the program as well as how the resulting
system would be employed. The ultimate result was a joint report presented
to the President and NSC on August 25, 1960.
3
As a result of that meeting Eisenhower approved a first SAMOS launch
in September, as well as reorientation of the program, with the development
of high-resolution film-return systems being assigned highest priority while
the electronic readout system would be pursued as a research project. With
regard to SAMOS management, he ordered that the Air Force institute special
management arrangements, which would involve a direct line of authority
between the SAMOS project office and the Office of the Air Force Secretary,
bypassing the Air Staff and any other intermediate layers of bureaucracy.
4
Secretary of the Air Force Dudley C. Sharp wasted little time creating
the recommended new structure and procedures. On August 31st Sharp signed
Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, establishing the Office of Missile
and Satellite Systems within his own office to help him manage the SAMOS
project. With Order 116.1, Sharp created a SAMOS project office at the Los
Angeles headquarters of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD)
as a field extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to carry
out development of the satellite.
5
The impact of the orders, in practice, was that the director of the
SAMOS project would report directly to Under Secretary of the Air Force
Joseph V. Charyk, who would manage it in the Secretary's name. In turn,
Charyk would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.
6
The changes would not stop there. The urgency attached to developing
a successful reconnaissance satellite led, ultimately, to the creation of
a top secret program and organization to coordinate the entire national
reconnaissance effort.
Several of the documents listed below also appear in either of two
National Security Archive microfiche collections on U.S. intelligence.
The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management:
1947-1989 (1990) and U.S. Espionage
and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996
(1997) publish together for the first time recently declassified documents
pertaining to the organizational structure, operations and management of
the U.S. Intelligence Community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed
for maximum accessibility. Together, these two sets reproduce on microfiche
over 2,000 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives,
reports, and studies, totaling more than 50,000 pages of documents from
the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National
Security Council, and other official government agencies and organizations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document 1
Joseph Charyk, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
24 July 1961
Top Secret
1 p.
The organizational changes resulting from the decisions of August 25,
1960 and their implementation left some unsatisfied. In particular, James
Killian and Edwin Land, influential members of the President's intelligence
advisory board pushed for permanent and institutionalized collaboration
between the CIA and Air Force. After the Kennedy administration took office
the push to establish a permanent reconnaissance organization took on additional
life. There was a strong feeling in the new administration, particularly
by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric,
that a better, more formalized relationship was required.
7
On July 24, 1961, Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk sent a memorandum
to McNamara attaching two possible memoranda of agreement for creation of
a National Reconnaissance Program, along with some additional material.
Document 2
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
(Draft)
20 July 1961
Top Secret
5 pp.
This memo specified establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program
(NRP) consisting of "all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects
whether overt or covert," and including "all photographic projects for intelligence,
geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects
for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence."
To manage the NRP, a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be
established on a covert basis. The NRO director (DNRO) would be the Deputy
Director for Plans, CIA (at the time, Richard Bissell) while the Under Secretary
of the Air Force would serve as Deputy Director (DDNRO). The DNRO would be
responsible for the management of CIA activities, the DDNRO and the Air Force
for Defense Department activities. The DoD, specifically the Air Force acting
as executive agent, would be primarily responsible for technical program management,
scheduling, vehicle operations, financial management and overt contract administration,
while the CIA would be primarily responsible for targeting each satellite.
The office would operate under streamlined management procedures similar
to those established in August 1960 for SAMOS.
Document 3
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
(Draft)
21 July 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.
This secondary memorandum was prepared at the suggestion of Defense Department
General Counsel Cyrus Vance. It offered a quite different solution to the
problem. As with the primary memo, it established an NRP covering both
satellite and aerial reconnaissance operations. But rather than a jointly
run program, it placed responsibility for management solely in the hands
of a covertly appointed Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, to be selected
by the Secretary of Defense. The office of the Special Assistant would
handle the responsibilities assigned to the NRO in the other Memorandum
Of Understanding. The CIA would "assist the Department of Defense by providing
support as required in areas of program security, communications, and covert
contract administration."
Document 4
Memorandum
Pros and Cons of Each Solution
Not dated
Top Secret
2 pp.
The assessment of pros and cons favored the July 20 memorandum, listing
five pros for the first solution and only two for the second. The first
solution would consolidate responsibilities into a single program with relatively
little disruption of established management, represented a proven solution,
would require no overt organizational changes, would allow both agencies
to retain authoritative voices in their areas of expertise, and provided
a simplified management structure. The two cons noted were the division
of program responsibility between two people, and that"successful program
management depends upon mutual understanding and trust of the two people
in charge of the NRO." It would not be too long before that later observation
would take on great significance.
In contrast, there were more cons than pros specified for the second
solution. The only two points in its favor were the consolidation of reconnaissance
activities into a single program managed by a single individual and the
assignment of complete responsibility to the agency Department of Defense
(DoD) with the most resources. Foremost of the six cons was the need for
DoD to control and conduct large-scale covert operations, in as much as
it was an entity "whose normal methods are completely foreign to this task."
Document 5
Roswell Gilpatric, Letter to Allen Dulles
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
6 September 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.
On July 28, 1961, four days after receiving Charyk's memorandum and draft
memoranda of understanding, McNamara instructed Air Force Undersecretary
Joseph Charyk to continue discussions with the key officials and advisers
in order to resolve any organizational difficulties that threatened to impede
the satellite reconnaissance effort. The ultimate result was this letter
from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Dulles, which confirmed
"our agreement with respect to the setting up of the National Reconnaissance
Program."
The letter specified the creation of a NRP. It also established the
NRO, a uniform security control system, and specified that the NRO would
be directly responsive to the intelligence requirements and priorities specified
by the United States Intelligence Board. It specified implementation of
NRP programs assigned to the CIA through the Deputy Director for Plans.
It designated the Undersecretary of the Air Force as the Defense Secretary's
Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, with full authority in DoD reconnaissance
matters.
The letter contained no specific assignment of responsibilities to
either the CIA or Defense Department, stating only that "The Directors of
the National Reconnaissance Office will ... insure that the particular talents,
experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program."
The letter provided for the NRO to be managed jointly by the Under
Secretary of the Air Force and the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (at the time,
still Richard Bissell). A May 1962 agreement between the CIA and Defense
Department established a single NRO director. Joseph Charyk was named to
the directorship shortly afterward.
Document 6
Joseph Charyk
Memorandum for NRO Program Directors/Director, NRO
Staff
Organization and Functions of the NRO
23 July 1962
Top Secret
11 pp.
This memorandum represents the fundamental directive on the organization
and functions of the NRO. In addition to the Director (there was no provision
for a deputy director), there were four major elements to the NRO--the NRO
staff and three program elements, designated A, B, and C. The staff's functions
included assisting the director in dealing with the USIB and the principal
consumers of the intelligence collected.
The Air Force Office of Special Projects (the successor to the SAMOS
project office) became NRO's Program A. The CIA reconnaissance effort was
designated Program B, while the Navy's space reconnaissance effort, at the
time consisting of the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) satellite,
whose radar ferret mission involved the collection of Soviet radar signals,
became Program C. Although the GRAB effort was carried out by the Naval
Research Laboratory, the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence would
serve as Program C director until 1971.
8
Document 7
Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence on Management of the National Reconnaissance
Program
13 March 1963
Top Secret
6 pp.
In December 1962, Joseph Charyk decided to leave government to become
president of the COMSAT Corporation. By that time a number of disputes
between the CIA and NRO had contributed to Charyk's view that the position
of the NRO and its director should be strengthened. During the last week
of February 1963, his last week in office, he completed a revision of a
CIA draft of a new reconnaissance agreement to replace the May 1962 agreement
(which had replaced the September 6, 1961 agreement). Charyk took the revision
to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. It appears that some
CIA-suggested changes were incorporated sometime after Charyk left office.
On March 13, Gilpatric signed the slightly modified version on behalf of
DoD. It was sent to the CIA that day and immediately approved by DCI John
McCone, who had replaced Allen Dulles in November 1961.
9
The new agreement, while it did not include all the elements Charyk
considered important, did substantially strengthen the authority of the
NRO and its director. It named the Secretary of Defense as the Executive
Agent for the NRP. The program would be "developed, managed, and conducted
in accordance with policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence."
The NRO would manage the NRP "under the direction, authority, and
control of the Secretary of Defense." The NRO's director would be selected
by the Defense Secretary with the concurrence of the DCI, and report to
the Defense Secretary. The NRO director was charged with presenting to
the Secretary of Defense "all projects" for intelligence collection and
mapping and geodetic information via overflights and the associated budgets,
scheduling all overflight missions in the NRP, as well as engineering analysis
to correct problems with collection systems. With regard to technical management,
the DNRO was to "assign all project tasks such as technical management, contracting
etc., to appropriate elements of the DoD and CIA, changing such assignments,
and taking any such steps he may determine necessary to the efficient management
of the NRP."
Document 8
Department of Defense Directive Number TS 5105.23
Subject: National Reconnaissance Office
27 March 1964
Top Secret
4 pp.
This directive replaced the original June 1962 DoD Directive on the NRO,
and remains in force today. The directive specifies the role of the Director
of the NRO, the relationships between the NRO and other organizations, the
director's authorities, and security. It specified that documents or other
material concerning National Reconnaissance Program matters would be handled
within a special security system (known as the BYEMAN Control System).
Document 9
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Memorandum for the President
Subject: National Reconnaissance Program
2 May 1964
Top Secret
11 pp.
The 1963 CIA-DoD agreement on the NRP did not end the battles between
the CIA and NRO--as some key CIA officials, including ultimately DCI John
McCone, sought to reestablish a major role for the CIA in the satellite
reconnaissance effort. The continuing conflict was examined by the PFIAB.
The board concluded that "the National Reconnaissance Program despite
its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential." The fundamental
cause for the NRP's shortcomings was "inadequacies in organizational structure."
In addition, there was no clear division of responsibilities and roles between
the Defense Department, CIA, and the DCI.
The recommendations of the board represented a clear victory for the
NRO and its director. The DCI should have a "large and important role"
in establishing intelligence collection requirements and in ensuring that
the data collected was effectively exploited, according to the board. In
addition, his leadership would be a key factor in the work of the United
States Intelligence Board relating to the scheduling of space and airborne
reconnaissance missions.
But the board also recommended that President Johnson sign a directive
which would assign to NRO¹s Air Force component (the Air Force Office
of Special Projects) systems engineering, procurement, and operation of all
satellite reconnaissance systems.
Document 10
Agreement for Reorganization of the National
Reconnaissance Program
13 August 1965
Top Secret
6 pp.
Despite the recommendations of the May 2, 1964 PFIAB report, which were
challenged by DCI John McCone, no action was taken to solidify the position
of the NRO and its director. Instead prolonged discussions over a new agreement
continued into the summer of 1965. During this period the CIA continued
work on what would become two key satellite programs--the HEXAGON/KH-9 imaging
and RHYOLITE signals intelligence satellites.
In early August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and CIA official
John Bross reached an understanding on a new agreement, and it was signed
by Vice Adm. William F. Raborn (McCone's successor) and Vance on August
13, 1965. It represented a significant victory for the CIA, assigning key
decision-making authority to an executive committee, authority that was
previously the prerogative of the NRO director as the agent of the Secretary
of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense was to have "the ultimate responsibility
for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP," and have the final
power to approve the NRP budget. The Secretary also was empowered to make
decisions when the executive committee could not reach agreement.
The DCI was to establish collection priorities and requirements for
targeting NRP operations, as well as establish frequency of coverage, review
the results obtained by the NRP and recommend steps for improving its results
if necessary, serve on the executive committee, review and approve the NRP
budget, and provide security policy guidance.
The NRP Executive Committee established by the agreement would consist
of the DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology. The committee was to recommend to the Secretary
of Defense the "appropriate level of effort for the NRP," approve or modify
the consolidated NRP and its budget, approve the allocation of responsibility
and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for
new systems. It was instructed to insure that funds would be adequate to
pursue a vigorous research and development program, involving both CIA and
DoD. The executive committee was to assign development of sensors to the
agency best equipped to handle the task.
The Director of the NRO would manage the NRO and execute the NRP "subject
to the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance
of the Executive Committee." His authority to initiate, improve, modify,
redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP,
would be subject to review by the executive committee. He could demand
that all agencies keep him informed about all programs undertaken as part
of the NRP.
Document 11
Analysis of "A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky" Washington
Post, December 9, 1973
Not dated
Top Secret
33 pp.
Throughout the 1960s, the United States operation of reconnaissance satellites
was officially classified, but well known among specialists and the press.
However, it was not until January 1971 that the NRO's existence was first
disclosed by the media, when it was briefly mentioned in a New York Times
article on intelligence and foreign policy.
A much more extensive discussion of the NRO appeared in the December
9, 1973 Washington Post as a result of the inadvertent mention of
the reconnaissance office in a Congressional report. The NRO prepared this
set of classified responses to the article, clearly intended for those in
Congress who might be concerned about the article's purported revelations
about the NRO's cost overruns and avoidance of Congressional oversight.
Document 12
E.C. Aldridge, Jr. (Director, NRO)
Letter to David L. Boren, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
21 November 1988
Secret
3 pp.
The late 1980s saw the beginning of what eventually would be a wide-ranging
restructuring of the NRO. In November 1988 NRO director Edward "Pete" Aldridge
wrote to Senator David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, concerning the findings of an extensive study (the NRO Restructure
Study) of the organizational structure of the NRO.
Aldridge proceeded to report that, after having discussed the study's
recommendations with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Director of
Central Intelligence William Webster, he was directing the development of
plans to implement the recommendations. Specific changes would include the
creation of a centralized systems analysis function "to conduct cross-system
trades and simulations within the NRO," creation of a "User Support" function
to improve NRO support to intelligence community users as well as to the
growing number of operational military users, and the dispersal of the NRO
Staff to the new units, with the staff being replaced by a group of policy
advisers. In addition, Aldridge foresaw the establishment of an interim
facility "to house the buildup of the new functions and senior management."
The ultimate goal, projected for the 1991-92 period, would be the "collocation
of all NRO elements [including the Los Angeles-based Air Force Office of
Special Projects] . . . in the Washington, D.C. area."
Document 13
Memorandum of Agreement
Subject: Organizational Restructure of the National
Reconnaissance Office
15 December 1988
Secret
2 pp.
This memorandum of agreement, signed by the Director of the NRO and the
directors of the NRO's three programs commits them to the restructuring
discussed in Edward Aldridge's November 21 letter to Senator Boren.
Many changes recommended by Aldridge, who left office at the end of
1988, were considered by a 1989 NRO-sponsored review group and subsequently
adopted.
Document 14
Report to the Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Task Force on The National Reconnaissance
Office, Final Report
April 1992
Secret
35 pp.
This report was produced by a panel chaired by former Lockheed Corporation
CEO Robert Fuhrman, whose members included both former and serving intelligence
officials. It focused on a variety of issues other than current and possible
future NRO reconnaissance systems. Among the issues it examined were mission,
organizational structure, security and classification.
One of its most significant conclusions was that the Program A,B,C
structure that had been instituted in 1962 (see Document
6) "does not enhance mission effectiveness" but "leads to counterproductive
competition and makes it more difficult to foster loyalty and to maintain
focus on the NRO mission." As a result, the panel recommended that the NRO
be restructured along functional lines with imagery and SIGINT directorates.
This change was made even before the final version of the report was issued.
The report also noted that while the NRO's
existence was officially classified it was an "open secret" and that seeking
to attempt to maintain such "open secrets ... weakens the case for preserving
'real' secrets." In addition, such secrecy limited the NRO's
ability to interact with customers and users. The group recommended declassifying
the "fact of" the NRO, as well as providing information about the NRO's
mission, the identities of senior officials, headquarters locations, and
the NRO as a joint Intelligence Community-Defense Department activity.
Document 15
National Security Directive 67
Subject: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005
30 March 1992
Secret
2 pp.
NSD 67 directed a number of changes in U.S. intelligence organization
and operations. Among those was implementation of the plan to restructure
the NRO along functional lines--eliminating the decades old Program A (Air
Force), B (CIA), and C (Navy) structure and replacing it with directorates
for imaging, signals intelligence, and communication systems acquisition
and operations--as recommended by the Fuhrman panel. As a result, Air Force,
CIA, and Navy personnel involved in such activities would now work together
rather than as part of distinct NRO components.
Document 16
Email message
Subject: Overt-Covert-DOS-REP-INPUT
27 July 1992
Secret
1 p.
In addition to the internal restructuring of the NRO, 1992 saw the declassification
of the organization, as recommended by the Fuhrman report (Document 14), for a number of reasons--to facilitate interaction
with other parts of the government, to make it easier for the NRO to support
military operations, and in response to Congressional pressure to acknowledge
the obvious. As part of the process of considering declassification NRO
consulted Richard Curl, head of the Office of Intelligence Resources of the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research--the office which
provides INR with expertise and support concerning technical collection systems.
Curl recommended a low-key approach to declassification.
Document 17
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Director of
Central Intelligence
Subject: Changing the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) to an Overt Organization
30 July 1992
Secret
3 pp.
w/ attachments:
Document 17a:
Mission of the NRO, 1 p.
Document 17b: Implications of Proposed Changes
, 4 pp. (Two versions)
Version One
Version Two
These memos, from Director of the NRO Martin Faga, represent key documents
in the declassification of the NRO. The memo noted Congressional pressure
for declassification and that Presidential certification that declassification
would result in "grave damage to the nation ... would be difficult in this
case."
Faga reported that as a result of an NRO review he recommended declassifying
the fact of NRO's existence, issuing a brief mission statement, acknowledging
the NRO as a joint DCI-Secretary of Defense endeavor, and identifying top
level NRO officials. He also noted that his recommendations attempted to
balance concerns about classifying information that realistically could not
be protected, while maintaining an ability to protect matters believed to
require continued protection.
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, DCI Robert Gates, and President
Bush approved the recommendations in September and a three-paragraph memorandum
to correspondents acknowledging the NRO and NRP was issued on September
18, 1992.
Document 17b comes in two versions, representing different security
reviews. Material redacted from the first version includes provisions of
National Security Directive 30 on space policy, statement of concern over
"derived disclosures," and the assessment that the "high degree of foreign
acceptance of satellite reconnaissance, and the fact that we are not disclosing
significant new data," would not lead to any significant foreign reaction.
Another redacted statement stated that "legislation . . . exempting all NRO
operational files from [Freedom of Information Act] searches" was required.
Document 18
Final Report: National Reconnaissance Program
Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence
September 1992
Top Secret
15 pp.
The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union required the
U.S. intelligence community and NRO to reconsider how U.S. overhead reconnaissance
systems were employed and what capabilities future systems should possess.
To consider these questions DCI Robert Gates appointed a task force, chaired
by his eventual successor, R. James Woolsey.
The final report considers future needs and collection methods, industrial
base considerations, procurement policy considerations, international industrial
issues, and transition considerations. Its recommendations included elimination
of both some collection tasks as well as some entire types of present and
planned collection systems.
Document 19
NRO Protection Review, "What is [BYEMAN]
?"
6 November 1992
Top Secret
18 pp.
Traditionally, the designations of Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) compartments--such as UMBRA to indicate particularly sensitive communications
intelligence and RUFF to intelligence based on satellite imagery--have themselves
been classified. In recent years, however, the NSA and CIA have declassified
a number of such terms and their meaning. One exception has been the term
"BYEMAN"-- the BYEMAN Control System being the security system used to protect
information related to NRO collection systems (in contrast to their products)
and other aspects of NRO activities, including budget and structure. Thus,
the term BYEMAN has been deleted in the title of the document and throughout
the study--although the term and its meaning has become known by specialists
and conveys no information beyond the text of any particular document.
This study addresses the use of the BYEMAN classification within the
NRO, its impact on contractors and other government personnel, and the consequences
of the current application of the BYEMAN system. The study concludes that
placing information in the highly restrictive BYEMAN channels (in contrast
to classifying the information at a lower level) may unduly restrict its
dissemination to individuals who have a legitimate need to know.
Document 20
NRO Strategic Plan
18 January 1993
Secret
19 pp.
A study headed by James Woolsey (Document 18), President Clinton's first DCI, heavily influenced the contents of this
early 1993 document. The plan's introduction notes that while some collection
tasks will no longer be handled by overhead reconnaissance the "uncertain
nature of the world that is emerging from the end of the 'cold war' places
a heavy premium on overhead reconnaissance." At the same time, "this overhead
reconnaissance challenge must be met in an era of a likely reduced national
security budget."
The strategic plan is described in the introduction, as "the 'game
plan' to transition current overhead collection architectures into a more
integrated, end-to-end architecture for improved global access and tasking
flexibility."
The document goes on to examine the strategic context for future NRO
operations, NRO strategy, strategic objectives, and approaches to implementation.
Strategic objectives include improving the responsiveness of NRO systems
by developing an architecture that spans the entire collection and dissemination
process, from the identification of requirements to dissemination of the
data collected.
Document 21
National Reconnaissance Office: Collocation Construction
Project, Joint DOD and CIA Review Report
November 1994
Unclassified
28 pp.
In an August 8, 1994 press conference, Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Az.)
and John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence accused the NRO of concealing from Congress the
cost involved in building a new headquarters to house government and contractor
employees. Previously NRO activities in the Washington area were conducted
from the Pentagon and rented space in the Washington metropolitan area.
The collocation and restructuring decisions of the late 1980s and early
1990s had resulted in a requirement for a new headquarters facility.
10
The accusations were followed by hearings before both the Senate and
House intelligence oversight committees--with House committee members defending
the NRO and criticizing their Senate colleagues. While they noted that
some of the documents presented by the NRO covering total costs were not
presented with desirable clarity, the House members were more critical of
the Senate committee for inattention to their committee work.
11
This joint DoD and CIA review of the project, found "no intent to
mislead Congress" but that "the NRO failed to follow Intelligence Community
budgeting guidelines, applicable to all the intelligence agencies," that
would have caused the project to be presented as a "New Initiative," and
that the cost data provided by the NRO "were not presented in a consistent
fashion and did not include a level of detail comparable to submissions for
. . . intelligence community construction."
Document 22
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel
Unclassified
July 1996
The concept of employing significantly smaller satellites for imagery
collection was strongly advocated by Rep. Larry Combest of Texas during
his tenure (1995-97) as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. As a result the DCI was instructed to appoint a panel of
experts to review the issue.
12
Panel members included former NRO directors Robert Hermann and Martin
Faga; former NRO official and NSA director Lew Allen; scientist Sidney Drell
and four others. The panel's report supported a radical reduction in the
size of most U.S. imagery satellites. The panel concluded that "now is
an appropriate time to make a qualitative change in the systems architecture
of the nation's reconnaissance assets," in part because "the technology
and industrial capabilities of the country permit the creation of effective
space systems that are substantially smaller and less costly than current
systems." Thus, the panel saw "the opportunity to move towards an operational
capability for . . . imagery systems, that consists of an array of smaller,
cheaper spacecraft in larger number with a total capacity which is at least
as useful as those currently planned and to transport them to space with
substantially smaller and less costly launch vehicles."
13
The extent to which those recommendations have influenced NRO's Future
Imagery Architecture plan is uncertain--although plans for large constellations
of small satellites have not usually survived the budgetary process.
Document 23
Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century,
Final Report, Executive Summary
August 26, 1996
Unclassified
30 pp.
This report was apparently the first major outside review of the NRO conducted
during the Clinton administration, and the first conducted after the NRO's
transformation to an overt institution and its restructuring were firmly
in place.
Among those conducting the review were former Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, former NRO director Martin
Faga, and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon. Issues
studied by the panel included, inter alia, the existence of a possible alternative
to the NRO, NRO's mission in the 21st Century, support to military operations,
security, internal organization, and the relationship with NRO's customers.
After reviewing a number of alternatives, the panel concluded that
no other arrangement was superior for carrying out the NRO mission. It did,
however, recommend, changes with regards to NRO's mission and internal organization.
The panel concluded that where the NRO's current mission is "worldwide intelligence,"
its future mission should be "global information superiority," which "demands
intelligence capabilities unimaginable just a few years ago." The panel
also recommended creation of a fourth NRO directorate, which was subsequently
established, to focus solely on the development of advanced systems, in order
to "increase the visibility and stature of technology innovation in the NRO."
Notes
1. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp.241-42; John Ranelagh, The Agency:
The Rise and Decline of the CIA, From Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 319; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald
Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp.
170-93.
2. Kenneth Greer, "Corona," Studies in Intelligence, Supplement 17, Spring
1973 in Kevin C. Ruffner (Ed.), CORONA: America's First Satellite Program
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 3-40; Gen. Thomas
D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff to General Thomas S. Power, Commander
in Chief, Strategic Air Command, June 29, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Library
of Congress, Box 34, Folder "2-15 SAC."
3. "Special Meeting of the National Security Council to be held in the
Conference Room of the White House from 8:30 a.m. to 10 a.m., Thursday, August
25, 1960, undated, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61, Executive
Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 15, Reconnaissance Satellites [1960],
DDEL.
4. "Reconnaissance Satellite Program," Action No.1-b at Special NSC Meeting
on August 25, 1960, transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by Memo of September
1, 1960; G.B. Kistiakowsky to Allen Dulles, August 25, 1960, Special Assistant
for Science and Technology, Box No. 15, Space [July-Dec 1960], DDEL.
5. Carl Berger, The Air Force in Space Fiscal Year 1961, (Washington,
D.C.: Air Force Historical Liaison Office, 1966), pp.41-42; Secretary of
the Air Force Order 115.1, "Organization and Functions of the Office of
Missile and Satellite Systems," August 31, 1960; Robert Perry, A History
of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance
Program, 1960-1965, (Washington, D.C., NRO, 1969), p. 20; Secretary of the
Air Force Order 116.1, "The Director of the SAMOS Project," August 31, 1960.
6. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 20.
7. Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and
Evolution of the NRO," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
13, 3 (Fall 2000): 301-344.
8. Ibid.; GRAB: Galactic Radiation and Background (Washington, D.C.: NRL,
1997); Dwayne A. Day, "Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence
Satellite," Spaceflight, August 1999, pp. 339-347; NRO, Program Directors
of the NRO: ABC&D, 1999.
9. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 93, 96-97.
10. Pierre Thomas, "Spy Unit's Spending Stuns Hill," Washington Post,
August 9, 1994, pp. A1, A6.
11. Walter Pincus, "Spy Agency Defended by House Panel," Washington
Post , August 12, 1994, p. A21; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, NRO Headquarters Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 3-4.
12. Walter Pincus, "Congress Debates Adding Smaller Spy Satellites to
NRO's Menu," Washington Post, October 5, 1995, p. A14; Joseph C.
Anselmo, "House, Senate at Odds Over Intel Small Sats," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, January 1, 1996, p. 19.
13. Small Satellite Review Panel, Memorandum for: Director of Central
Intelligence, Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel, July 1996.
Ed's Note: This is just another example of maintaining the status quo.
The NRO only exists to monitor people in order to maintain the hegemony of
the United States. There is no conceivable reason for this organization to
exist other than that.